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Terms of Use: Reflections on a Theme 
 
Eliza Mik1 
 
Singapore Management University 
 
 
Abstract 
The paper presents multiple perspectives on the unpopular but omnipresent terms of use 
(or "ToUs"), i.e. terms and conditions contained in a link at the bottom of many 
websites. ToUs serve different functions: from governing the transaction taking place on 
a website, (e.g. contracts of sale) to the very act of browsing. Accordingly, every 
browsing experience has both a commercial and a legal tint. On a theoretical level ToUs 
raise concerns with regards to their validity as legally binding contracts as well as to 
their incorporation.  Both formation and incorporation converge on the presence and 
quality of contractual intention. The latter underpins the freedom of contract - a concept 
frequently overlooked in endless discussions of "click-" and "browse-wrap" agreements. 
One must not be deceived by the paper's purely contractual perspective - problems of 
ToUs underlie many legal aspects of privacy and intellectual property.  Our most 
important online relationships with providers like amazon, facebook or google are 
governed by ToUs that are frequently perceived as irrelevant, unimportant or simply 
unenforceable. Many traditional arguments raised "against" standard terms can be 
transposed onto online ToUs. Care must be taken not to imply that these arguments are 
new or unprecedented. What cannot be denied, however, is that the growing importance 
of ToUs online sheds new light on these "old" problems and forces a re-evaluation of 
some traditional positions in light of the technological possibility of ensuring a nearly 
seamless communication process: informing the website user that terms exist and 
ensuring their availability. At present, the problem has not been addressed in any of the 
Asian jurisdictions. Given the growing importance of online transactions in their 
national economies it is only a question of time when courts will have to confront ToUs 
in all their complexity. 
 
 
 
Introduction  
They are everywhere, yet we pretend they do not exist. They govern our every move 
and our most intimate relationships online, yet we deny their validity. They make us 
surrender our private information and the copyright to our content, yet we assume (or 
hope?) that they do not. Terms of use (“ToU” or “terms”) accompany every online 
transaction or, to be more precise, interaction. We do not “go on the Internet” to 
enjoy the technicalities of the TCP/IP protocol. We go on the Internet to do things: to 
read, to watch movies, to listen to music, to communicate with friends or simply to 
work. Most of these activities are (or purport to be?) subject to contract, regulated by 
a set of standard terms placed on the bottom of the webpage. We often refer to these 
terms as “hidden” behind a hyperlink although the hyperlink by its very nature 
renders them immediately available for our review. We prefer to believe, however, 
that such terms do not bind us and can thus be ignored. We also endlessly complain 
about companies like google and facebook: they “steal” our data and 
“misappropriate” our personal information by using it for targeted advertising. We 
prefer not to acknowledge the possibility that our use of the services and content 
provided by google & co may be subject to a contract, worse yet – that we may have 
agreed to the very things we are complaining about. ToUs abound in controversies 	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and misunderstandings. Their validity or enforceability as contracts is frequently 
questioned on the basis of popular sentiment – not legal principle.  
 
Below, I reflect on some basic legal problems pertaining to ToUs from a contract law 
perspective. I steer clear form oversimplifications at the risk of sounding overly 
theoretical or doctrinal. Three general observations are necessary. First, we can no 
longer refer to the Internet and related legal issues as “new” or “revolutionary.” The 
Internet is no longer an emerging technology. It has become an integral part of 
everyday life. One generation grew up with (or on?) the Internet. Older generations 
are becoming more technology literate. Most of us can no longer plead ignorance of 
Internet-related issues, be it technological (“what is email?”) or legal (“I had no idea 
file sharing of copyright music is illegal!)”. Second, we must acknowledge the 
differences between the offline environment (a.k.a. the “real world”) and the online 
world.2 We must not, however, exaggerate these differences. We still intuitively 
assume that the “online world” or “cyberspace” is governed by no rules or at least by 
different rules.  Separatist movements and the accompanying references to 
“cyberspace” are a thing of the past, though. In the words of one judge, the question is 
not whether traditional legal principles apply in cyberspace but - how do they apply?3 
The Internet is not an excuse to abandon basic concepts of contract law.4 Third, when 
discussing the Internet, we are always in a transitional period. The Internet, its 
technologies, applications and business models are constantly evolving.5 In the near 
future we might be looking at todays’ legal problems and technical concepts with the 
same sentiment as we look at pacman and floppy discs today. On the Internet, any 
novelty is temporary. ToUs underpin many different transactions and interactions. 
They intersect with broader issues of privacy, intellectual property and transactions in 
information, areas that are not only complex in their own right but also subject to 
constant developments. In particular, any legal controversies in the subject areas that 
are governed by ToUs will invariably affect our perception and arguments pertaining 
to ToUs.  Consequently, like any other academic attempt in this area, the discussion 
faces the difficulty of drawing clear distinctions or constructing arguments that will 
remain relevant for more than 1 year. Despite this fluctuating legal and technological 
landscape, Asian jurisdictions are in a unique position of being able to learn from the 
mistakes made in both the EU and in the US. Singapore, which follows the English 
common law of contract, enjoys two benefits: the benefit of a system of principles 
that have proven extremely stable yet flexible in light of technological change and, 
the benefit of hindsight and the resulting ability to better appreciate of the legal 
problems involved in online transactions.  
 
Online shopping and transactions in information  
The importance of ToUs can only be appreciated against the backdrop of actual 
economic trends. The Internet economy is moving from simple retail exchanges to 
sophisticated transactions in information and services. Amazon.com is no longer just 
an online retailer of books and CDs but a provider of web services and cloud 
computing. The Internet is not is not just about communication anymore, but about 
distribution and access. In parallel, we observe a general commercialization of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See generally: J E Cohen, ‘Cyberspace as/and Space’ (2007) 107 Colum. L. Rev. 210, who discusses the division between the 
online world and the real world on conceptual level 
3 Chwee Kin Keong v Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd [2004] SGHC 71 at 91 per V K Rajah JC 
4 See generally: Cheryl B Preston, Eli W McCann, Unwrapping shrinkwraps, clickwraps, and browsewraps: how the law went 
wrong from horse traders to the law of the horse (2012) 26 BYU J. Pub. L. 1  
5 Chris Reed, Making Laws for Cyberspace (OUP 2012)   
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web, a transition from a “free everything” approach to restricted access models. The 
complexity of this environment is reflected in the difficulty of finding the appropriate 
terminology. There are many labels we can give to the same legal phenomenon and 
there are many ways of looking at the same thing. ToUs can be referred to as “Terms 
of Service” or, in some contexts, as End User License Agreements. ToUs govern 
online shopping as well as software licensing. More importantly, they play an 
important role in the commodification of information.6 As more value is placed both 
on the information made available by website and platform providers (“operators”) 
and on the information provided by users, ToUs become a convenient method of 
circumscribing the permissions granted by the former or surrendered by the latter. 
Transactions in information are generally associated with the importance of private 
agreement in the context of copyright law and digital rights management.7 The degree 
to which certain rights can be created by contract remains controversial. What is 
beyond controversy, however, is that when the contractual subject matter is 
information, its value differs depending on what uses are permitted.8 ToUs can thus 
be essential in shaping this subject matter.9  Given the difficulty of differentiating 
between information and services, I assume that the former include the latter. After 
all, the term “information services” is gaining popularity. News websites are often 
regarded as services although they seem to perform the same function as traditional 
newspapers. The latter have never been perceived as services, even if we ignore the 
physical embodiment of paper and focus on the provision of information. 
Accordingly, “access” and “use” can be used interchangeably.  
 
There is nothing new about terms governing a transaction, such as a sale of goods, or 
terms imposing communication rules, similar to those encountered in Electronic Data 
Interchange agreements.10 There is also nothing new about some terms being unfair. 
The novelty lies in the subject matter and the resulting prevalence of ToUs. Once the 
website itself and the information provided thereon become the object of the 
transaction many online activities become subject to contract. Interactions morph into 
transactions. In parallel to the commercialization of the Internet we can speak of a 
“contractualization” of online relationships. ToUs seem to regulate every move online 
– as every move involves access or use of information. ToUs can contain different 
types of provisions: some govern the use of the website, others the specific 
transaction. The former may contain a number of Internet-specific provisions, such as 
the exclusion of liability for website errors11 (e.g. the malfunctioning of the electronic 
agent deployed by the operator) as well as communication rules prescribing that, for 
example, by staying on the site the user accepts its terms.12 The latter may contain 
more familiar provisions relating to classic sale of goods transactions, such as product 
warranties and conditions of delivery. This distinction is clearly made by 
amazon.com, which divides its terms into “conditions of sale and use.” 13 This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See generally: A Ottolia, D Wielsch, Mapping the Information Environment: Legal Aspects of Modularization and 
Digitalization (2003-2004) 6 Yale J.L. & Tech 174  
7 Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of Private Ordering in Information Transactions, (2000) 53 (6) Vanderbilt Law Rev. 
2063, at 2063  
8 R Nimmer, Through the Looking Glass: What Courts and UCITA Say about the Scope of Contract Law in the Information 
Age (2000) 38 Duq L Rev 255 
9  Niva Elkin-Koren, Governing access to user-generated content: the changing nature of private ordering in digital networks 
[318-342] at 321, in Governance, Regulations and Powers on the Internet, ed., E Brousseau, M Marzouki, C Meadel, (2012) 
Cambridge University Press 
10  J B Ritter, J Y Gliniecki, ‘Electronic Communications and Legal Change: International Electronic Commerce and 
Administrative Law: The Need for Harmonized National Reforms’ (1993) 6 Harv J Law & Tech 263 
11 M Chissick, G Vesey, The Perils of On-Line Contracting (2000) 6 (5) CTLR 121-122  
12 See generally: S K Sandeen, The Sense and Nonsense of Web Site Terms of Use Agreements (2003) 26 HMLR 499 
13 See: www.amazon.co.uk/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=footer_cou/275-6210360-5283240?ie=UTF8&nodeId=1040616 
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distinction is absent when the website itself constitutes the object of the transaction. 
In other words, ToUs increasingly govern not just online shopping but the very use of 
websites. I intentionally avoid references to e-commerce, which seems increasingly 
difficult to define. Although historically the term denoted the use of the Internet to 
conduct business,14 the concept of e-commerce may now have to be expanded to 
include online activity in general. In this unexpectedly broad context, access to 
information, or browsing, is seen as consent to a contract and to the ToUs displayed 
on the website.  
 
Formation and Incorporation 
Online activity is governed by a complex web of rules, which originate from 
legislatures, governmental agencies, international organizations and – from the 
transacting parties themselves.15  ToUs can thus be regarded as a form of self-
regulation or private ordering.16 ToUs exist within a broader legal framework, the 
rules of which they must follow as a condition of enforceability.17 ToUs must be 
distinguished from community norms. The latter are often perceived as reflecting the 
early spirit of Internet self-governance. Community norms are not, however, legally 
enforceable. It is only a valid contract that carries the protection of the state.18 
Unsurprisingly, the framework for online commercial activity is made of thousands of 
contracts. ToUs raise concerns regarding the formation (i.e. existence) of a contract, 
the incorporation of terms and the communication of intention (i.e. acceptance). Legal 
discussions often conflate questions regarding the quality of intention with questions 
pertaining to general validity. For present purposes it must be recalled that 
incorporation and formation are discrete concepts, discussed in separate chapters in 
textbooks on contract law. While this separation may appear artificial at times, each 
concept raises a set of different legal problems. In the context of ToUs, the distinction 
between the formation of a contract and the incorporation of terms into a contract 
must be maintained. Formation concerns the existence (validity, enforceability) of a 
contract. It involves the concepts of consideration and intention. Incorporation 
concerns the contents of an existing contract. This division is also reflected in the 
concepts of freedom of contract and freedom to contract. 19  Incorporation may, 
however, indirectly affect the contract’s existence. Such will be the case when the 
terms that are to be incorporated prescribe the manner of expressing intention (e.g. 
“by staying on the site you agree to be bound by…”). Technically, if terms have not 
been communicated, which is a prerequisite of incorporation (at least theoretically) 
the other party does not know how to express intention.  To complicate matters, the 
legal problems relating to formation and incorporation become dangerously 
intermingled when debating the validity or effectiveness of ToUs. At times then, they 
must be analyzed together. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 K C Laudon, C G Traver E-commerce 2014: Business, Technology, Society (10th ed, Prentice Hall 2014) 
15 B Daffains, Jane K. Winn, The effects of electronic commerce technologies on business contracting behaviors [344- 366] at 
347, in Governance, Regulations and Powers on the Internet, ed., E Brousseau, M Marzouki, C Meadel, (2012) Cambridge 
University Press 
16 Niva Elkin-Koren, Governing access to user-generated content: the changing nature of private ordering in digital networks 
[318-342]; on self-regulation generally see: Robert Baldwin, M. Cave, M. Lodge, Understanding Regulation – Theory, 
Strategy, Practice (2nd ed, OUP 2012) at 3 
17 Margaret Jane Radin & R Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace (1998) 
73 Chicago-Kent Law Rev. 1295, at 1296 
18 Jack Goldsmith, Tim Wu, Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a borderless world (OUP 2006) 138 
19 Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827 at 848 
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Are ToUs contracts? 
Despite their omnipresence and importance, it is still frequently questioned whether 
ToUs are contracts. This question is synonymous with “are ToUs binding?” or “are 
they enforceable?” Users assume (or hope) that they are not; operators insist they are. 
The answer boils down to basics. A valid and enforceable contract requires 
consideration and intention. No formalities are required. Contract law is extremely 
flexible and “forward compatible” in the sense of being able to accommodate new 
methods of communicating intention as well as new forms of consideration. A quick 
look reveals that ToUs can be valid contracts, or – that there is nothing in the law of 
that would prevent a contract coming into existence in the circumstances typical to the 
presentation of ToUs. Consideration need not be adequate or measurable in monetary 
terms. It suffices that one party suffers a detriment or that the other obtains a benefit. 
These principles are easily transposed online: operators derive benefits from their 
users.20 In return for viewing content or using a service, users “pay” (or suffer a 
detriment) by permitting (or enabling) the collection of their personal information. 
While most of the information is provided “free of charge,” the absence of payment is 
not synonymous with the absence of consideration. The latter may consist in the 
permission to study browsing behavior.21 After all, the main resource in the Internet 
economy is personal information, which includes not only the sign-up information 
users voluntarily submit when setting up an account with e.g. facebook or google but 
also the information disclosed “involuntarily,” without intention or awareness. A 
problem seems to arise at this juncture: can consideration be provided 
unintentionally? Problems of consideration usually pertain to its adequacy or 
sufficiency in the eyes of the law. The question is “did a party provide 
consideration?” – not “did a party intend to provide consideration?” In a recent 
English case, it was emphasized that consideration need not be the output of a 
conscious thought process.22 In the same context, however, the court emphasized that 
when the detriment is suffered there must be a belief that something will be received 
in return. Although consideration and intention are analyzed separately,23 there is an 
inevitable overlap between the two. Users provide their personal information because 
they have been asked to do so as a condition of using the service or accessing the 
content. When users relinquish any rights to their content or personal information, 
they do so because they have agreed to it. Unexpectedly, the provision of information 
seems to be interrelated with intention, the second indispensable component of every 
contract. Surprisingly, the presence of consideration may thus depend on – or at least 
correlate with - the legal effect of the act purporting to be an expression of intention. 
Intention is evaluated objectively from the perspective of a reasonable addressee. On 
one hand, contract law presumes intention based on choice and voluntariness. On the 
other, contract law is concerned with identifying the circumstances in which parties 
are regarded as having reached agreement. Intention is therefore a product of context. 
It is also important to note that intention can be expressed in any manner. The parties 
can “conduct themselves in relation to each other that an implied contract” is to be 
inferred from their conduct.”24 The acts of browsing or clicking can manifest intention 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Diane Rowland, Ute Kohl, Andrew Charlesworth, Information Technology Law (Routledge 4th ed. 2012) (“Information 
Technology Law”) at 254; for a description of various revenue models based on user activity see: Dave Chaffey, E-Business & 
E-Commerce Management (Prentice Hall London 2013) 76 
21 J K Winn, Contracting Spyware by Contract (2005) 20 Berkeley Tech L J 1345 at 1349, 1354; see also E-Commerce 
Directive Recital 18 and Metropolitan International Schools Ltd v Designtechnica Corporation and Google UK and Google 
Inc [2009] 1765 QB 
22 Pitts v Jones [2007] EWCA Civ 1301 at 18 
23 although historically, consideration was regarded as proof of intention, see: Pillans v Van Mierop (1765) 3 Burr. 1663 
24 Chitty on Contract, 31st ed (2013) Vol. I. para. 2-163 
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in the same way as handshakes, nods or signatures.25 Legally, these acts are of equal 
value - a fact often forgotten by those who doubt the enforceability of online 
agreements. The popular concern that “just browsing” cannot be regarded as consent 
to a contract or the acceptance of its terms26 is thus unjustified. ToUs can be treated at 
par with any other contract even if it is the website itself that constitutes the subject 
matter of the transaction and even if intention is expressed by a click.   
 
The story does not end here, though. The fact that ToUs can be valid contracts, or that 
merely browsing a website can lead to a legally enforceable agreement, does not 
mean that they are devoid of other legal challenges. Some of these challenges are real; 
others seem to derive from a misapprehension of the basic principles of contract law 
and the simple, popular dislike of ToUs. This dislike often translates into arguments 
that ToUs should not be binding. Two points arise: first, we must not idealize 
traditional contracting and imply that offline practice requires a “meeting of minds” 
or “actual agreement.” Informed choice and the communication of intention or terms 
are abstract ideals, not strict requirements. The ability to negotiate is not a prerequisite 
of a valid agreement, neither is the existence of real choice whether to contract. 
Principle must be distinguished from practice. Second, we must abandon the 
romanticized view of Internet self-regulation, including its participatory character or 
“contractual self-determination.” Many of us remember the early cyberspace 
scholarship of Johnson and Post, who famously advocated a self-regulatory model for 
online activity as naturally deriving from the decentralized character of the Internet.27 
Similarly, the concept of private ordering assumes that each party voluntarily choses 
to undertake the norms that will govern its behavior.  Internet literature is permeated 
with notions of freedom, equality and opportunity. Again, the latter are abstract 
ideals, which derive from popular articles or populist slogans that are not necessarily 
supported by rational legal arguments. The Internet is nothing but a collection of 
protocols enabling a variety of communication methods. It has no inherent nature and 
does not embody any humanist values. Ideals must be distinguished from reality. 
Neither the real world nor the “online world” are as perfect as we tend to portray them 
when constructing arguments against the legal effectiveness of ToUs. The 
“exceptionality” of the Internet does not change the principles of contract law. 
 
A question of incorporation? 
We must also look at ToUs from the perspective of incorporation. Traditionally, once 
the existence of a contract is not in doubt, the next step is the determination of its 
contents. This frequently involves an inquiry as to what terms have become 
incorporated into the contract. English courts adopt a less liberal approach to 
incorporation whenever the other party is a consumer thereby indirectly 
counterbalancing the negative effects of standardization or the unfairness of specific 
terms. The fairness of a term can thus impact on the effectiveness of its incorporation. 
It may be easier to declare that a particular provision has not been incorporated than 
establishing that it is unfair or unreasonable.28 English courts have developed multiple 
methods of analyzing incorporation. Terms can become part of the contract: by 
signature, by reasonable notice, under the principles established in the ticket cases, by 
reference or by sufficient course of dealing. Although there are significant differences 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 R A Hillman, J J Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age (2002) 77 NYULR 429 at 463 
26 M A Lemley, ‘Terms of Use’ (2006) 91 Minn L Rev 459 at 460; L Lessig ‘The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might 
Teach Us’ (1999) 113 Harv L Rev 501, 519 
27 David R Johnson and David Post, Law and Borders – The Raise of Law in Cyberspace (1996) 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1367 at 1388 
28 Interfoto Picture Library Ltd vs Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd [1987] EWCA Civ 6 
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between these methods, they share some important characteristics. The underlying 
principle is that the party who is not seeking to deal on its terms, has the right to know 
the proposed terms of the contract before assenting to it. And so, if a document is 
signed, the signatory is bound, regardless whether he has read the document.29 A 
misrepresentation of the effect or the contents of the document may prevent 
incorporation.30 Despite the broad understanding of the term “signature,” the classic 
cases deal with handwritten signatures on documents that were evidently contractual. 
The point here, however, is not to debate what constitutes a signature in online 
transactions.31 The point is that signatures, whether traditional or “electronic” have a 
certain legal effect only if they are placed on a contractual document. In other words, 
the nature of the document distinguishes a signature that results in incorporation from 
a signature that does not. When it comes to incorporation by notice, it is accepted that 
such notice must be reasonable in light of the accompanying circumstances.32 More 
notice is required for particularly onerous provisions.33 The sufficiency of notice is 
evaluated objectively, with the reasonable addressee in mind. People are expected to 
know that certain contracts are generally governed by terms.34 In “ticket cases” courts 
often engage in hair-splitting analyses regarding the exact moment the ticket is 
provided. Successful incorporation largely hinges on the time of delivery.35 More 
importantly, the nature of the document (i.e. the ticket) must be obvious.36 It must be 
reasonable to expect terms, or at least writing, on the ticket. We could extrapolate 
from these principles that the less obvious the transactional context (or, the more 
unexpected terms) the more notice should be provided. While websites are neither 
tickets nor documents, we can assume that in certain circumstances it is reasonable to 
expect terms “on” them. With regards to incorporation by reference, it is 
acknowledged that the full text of the terms may be difficult to present in the 
contractual document or at the time of transacting. Reference can be made to the 
standard terms of one party. The party seeking to incorporate terms must specifically 
point to the document containing such or to the place where they can be found. 
Successful incorporation may depend on the wording of the reference37 and/or the 
construction of the incorporating document.38 Courts have tolerated references to 
terms available in remote locations, such as references on tickets made to terms in 
offices. 39  Such “tolerance” illustrates the often fictional character of the 
“communication of terms.” It must be re-emphasized that the objective approach 
requires appearances of intention. A contract comes into being even if one party 
subjectively believed that he would not be bound until a formal document was 
prepared.40 Websites can be designed to take advantage of the objective theory of 
contract, without actually informing the other party of the terms. We can speak of a 
risk of “exploitation” of the objective approach or of “creative compliance.” 
Operators can reduce the likelihood of the terms’ review by providing minimal yet 
sufficient notice or making it cumbersome to obtain them. Similarly, in the real world, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 L’Estrange v F Graucob Ltd [1934] 2 KB 394; Parker v South Eastern Railway Co (1877) 2 CPD 416 
30 Curtis v Chemical Cleaning and Dyeing Co [1951] 1 KB 805 
31 For a discussion of this subject see: Elizabeth McDonald ‘Incorporation of Terms in Website Contracting – Clicking ‘I Agree’’ 
(2013) JCL 27, 198 
32 Chapelton v Barry Urban District Council [1940] 1 KB 532; Balmain New Ferry Co Ltd v Robertson (1906) 4 CLR 379;  
33 Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd [1989] QB 433 
34 Cockerton v Naviera Aznar, SA [1960] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 450 
35 Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd [1971] 2 QB 163 at 169 
36 Hood v Anchor Line (Henderson Bros) Ltd [1918] AC 837; see also: Atiyah p 186 
37 OK Petroleum AB v Vitol Energy SA [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 160 
38 Hong Kong Borneo Services Co Ltd v Pilcher [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 593  
39 Hollingworth v Southern Ferries Ltd (“The Eagle”) [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 70 
40 Tweddel v Henderson [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1496; Storer v Manchester City Council [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1403, 1408 
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courts have tolerated terms contained in small print or “made available” only upon 
request. Operators can always claim that had the user paid more attention to what was 
displayed on-screen, he would have noticed the link to the terms. The question is: 
why would the user pay attention? 
 
A question of context? 
As indicated above, terms must be presumed in a contractual setting or when the 
document provided is objectively contractual. Once their existence is brought to 
attention (in however minimal way possible), the party is expected to make inquiries 
regarding their actual content.  If, however, it is not apparent that a transaction is 
taking place, there is no reason to assume that a contract is required or that terms 
exist. It must be clarified that the parties need not perceive the situation as contractual 
or contemplate the full legal implications of their actions, e.g. that taking goods to the 
check-out will result in a contract of sale and terms will be implied by statute.41 While 
all legal consequences of a particular act need not be envisaged or intended, contracts 
are rarely entered into involuntarily or accidentally. In the real world, transactions 
occur in a familiar environment, contracts come into being in a specific context. An 
intention to create legal relations can only be presumed in a commercial or at least 
transactional setting 42  
 
A lot of scholarship has been devoted to “click-wrap” and “browse-wrap” 
agreements, which symbolize online contracts of adhesion. “Click-wraps” include an 
additional element that must be activated before the transaction is completed (e.g. an 
‘I agree’ tick-box), whereas “browse-wraps” lack such element. In the majority of 
circumstances, ToUs fall under the “browse-wrap” category. We need not, however, 
continue the debate whether an additional click is a condition of enforceability. 
Theoretically, it is not. Contract formation and the incorporation of terms occur in one 
act. Acceptance, or any other final manifestation of intention, concludes the contract 
together with its terms. The theory behind “clickwraps” is misconceived. The 
formation of a contract or the incorporation of terms does not hinge on the number of 
clicks or additional graphical elements that must be activated. The problem boils 
down to notifying the user that a transaction is taking place. If the existence of a 
contract is not in question, the notification should pertain to the existence of terms. 
Complications may arise if terms prescribe communication rules,43 e.g. remaining on 
the site constitutes assent to the terms and to the contract. The fact that the user knows 
(or should know) about the terms and proceeds within the site indicates an objective 
intention to contract.44 The legal consequence of remaining on the site must be 
brought to the user's attention. By definition, interacting with graphical user interfaces 
such as the world-wide-web, involves clicking. The legal effect of a click, if any, 
depends on the objective evaluation of context in which it occurred. The transactional 
context is immediately apparent whenever there is a commercial exchange, i.e. 
ordering goods from amazon.com or downloading music from iTunes. Problems arise 
when the transactional context is transparent, when the user is unaware that an 
exchange is occurring. It is not necessarily reasonable to expect terms. In such 
instance, a click can neither express intention to be contractually bound nor the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 e.g. Sale of Goods Act  1979 
42 M J Madison, Rights of Access and the Shape of the Internet (2003) 44 B C L Rev 433 at 457  
43 Register.com Inc v Verio Inc 356 F 3d 393 (2nd Cir 2004); Hubbert v Dell Corp, 835 NE2d 113 (Ill 2005); Cairo Inc v 
Crossmedia Services, Inc, 2005 WL 756610 (NDCA 2005); Ticketmaster Corp v Tickets.com,Inc WL 21406289, 2003 US Dist 
Lexis 6483 (2003) 
44 M J Radin, Online Standardization and the Integration of Text and Machine (2002) 70 Fordham L Rev 1125 at 1126 
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acceptance of terms. A click for navigational purposes does not differ from a click 
expressing intention or obtain a benefit. 45  We cannot agree, however, a click 
interpreted to indicate contractual intention is different from a click made to obtain a 
benefit.46 Taking “something” constitutes assent to whatever terms accompany this 
“something.” In cases like Specht v Netscape Communications,47 where the user 
downloaded software, the differentiation between incorporation and formation 
becomes important. We can download software and not be aware that there are terms 
governing its use (e.g. due to insufficient notice). We cannot, however, claim that we 
had no awareness of a transaction. It is becoming increasingly difficult to argue that 
something can be taken without an expectation that something must be given in return 
or that it is subject to contractual restrictions. Much will depend on the type of 
information being accessed or the type of benefit being obtained. Here, we must 
distinguish between music, movies or software on one side, and “pure information” 
on the other.   
 
One reason many users may not perceive the context as transactional (and hence not 
expect terms) is the continuing expectation of “free everything.” Historically most of 
the information on the Internet was available without charge and without restrictions. 
It could thus be claimed that users generally do not expect that access to information 
is governed by terms or that it may result in or require a contract. Absent an 
expectation of a transaction, there can be no reasonable expectation of terms. Users 
expect unrestricted access to any content that is made available on websites or 
platforms. After all, the popular rhetoric is that “information wants to be free.” On 
one hand then, there is a sense of entitlement to free content. On the other, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to claim ignorance of the following: (a) it is expensive to create 
high quality content; (b) content is frequently the object of intellectual property 
protections or other restrictions (c) it is very expensive to keep content available. The 
copyrights of content owners are widely ignored and infringed. The fact that 
companies like facebook and google maintain server farms and maintain additional 
connectivity to shorten access times is conveniently forgotten. Moreover, if users 
claim (or assume) that information should be free and access to it should be 
unrestricted – why do they complain if their information is being used? We either 
recognize information as an asset or we reject the very concept of information 
carrying value. The “I had no idea this information is restricted”-argument is 
untenable. And with it: “I had no idea that I am bound by the terms on the bottom of 
the webpage!” We can endlessly debate what creates a transactional context. We 
must, however, realize that we cannot built arguments based on users’ “wishful 
thinking.” Users cannot ignore the ToUs on the ground that they assumed (or hoped) 
they are not binding. 10 years ago it might have been difficult to speak of general 
usages of trade or reasonable expectations. Presently, websites are being designed 
along similar lines. Conventions have developed as to how content is presented. Many 
websites follow a similar pattern of providing a link to the ToUs at the bottom of the 
page. Such link not only serves as notice of terms but also guarantees their immediate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 See e.g. Federal Trade Comm v The Crescent Publishing Group Inc 129 F Supp 2d311 (SDNY 2001), where the fact that 
progressing within the site will result in charging the user’s credit card was not made obvious. 
46 In Specht v Netscape Communications 306 F 3d 17 (2nd Cir 2002) the court held that clicking "Download" did not indicate 
assent in the same way that clicking "I Assent" does, downloading being "hardly an unambiguous indication of assent." The 
primary purpose of downloading was obtaining a product, whereas "clicking on an icon stating 'I assent' has no meaning or 
purpose other than to indicate such assent." 
47 In Specht v Netscape Communications 306 F 3d 17 
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availability. 48 Can this presentation of ToUs be considered manipulative? Can the 
link be regarded as “hidden”? In this context, we could also debate the adequacy of 
notice, in terms of its “conspicuousness” and its ability to “survive” different browser 
versions. We must be clear, however, what notice should pertain to: the existence of 
terms, the existence of access restrictions or simply the fact that a contract is being 
made? Can it be said that the very presence of theToUs creates a transactional 
context? Or, without even debating whether terms create context, can users plead 
ignorance of something that is known to be there? We enter a vicious circle: what 
makes the context transactional? Terms cannot be expected absent such context, yet 
they are always there. Because ToUs are on the bottom of almost every website, users 
should expect them. The repeated use of a website could thus lead to an incorporation 
by course of dealing.49 It must be admitted, however, that the logic behind this 
argument is somewhat unconventional in the sense of diverging from the basic 
principles of contract law. Traditionally, users should expect terms when a transaction 
is taking place. Here, users are expected to know that a transaction is taking place 
because terms exist! Given that it is inherently difficult to decide whether the 
transactional context is a prerequisite of (an expectation of) terms or whether terms 
are a prerequisite of a transactional context, the question seems to be one of 
contractual subject matter. Ultimately, it is the latter that creates the context and 
should shape user expectations accordingly. Needless to say, problems inherent in the 
lack of transactional context are minimized when operators condition access to their 
content on the prior establishment of an account. The latter involves not only an 
agreement to terms, but also the provision of payment information and other personal 
details. Given that the latter acts are deliberate, it is highly unlikely for accounts to be 
created unintentionally.  This stands in contrast to terms that purport to bind a user 
who is “only” browsing. 
 
A look afar: US/EU 
Despite substantial differences in legal technique and tradition, civil and common law 
jurisdictions display many similarities in the regulation of online activity. In both 
types of jurisdictions, such activity is predominantly governed by contract. 50 
Consequently, the main difference between them lies in the manner contract law is 
applied to online transactions and in the way top-down regulatory instruments 
influence such application. It can be generalized that in the U.S. it is the courts who 
test the adequacy of transactional interfaces in light of the applicable principles of 
law, while in Europe it is regulatory agencies who prescribe certain rules and 
supervise their implementation. The UK lies in-between those two approaches. 
Although it is a common law jurisdiction, it must implement EU directives by means 
of subsidiary regulatory instruments.   
 
In the US, most developments in the area of online contracting derive from judicial 
decisions, which often focus on the enforceability of arbitration or forum selection 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 See, e.g. UNCTRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce Art 5bis, “Incorporation by reference”: Information shall not be 
denied legal effect, validity and enforceability solely on the grounds that it is not contained in the data message purporting to 
give rise to such legal effect, but is merely referred to in that data message.  
49 Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] 2 All ER 121 
50 Andrew Murray, Information Technology Law 2010 Oxford University Press (“Murray”) p 413; P. B. Hugenholtz, Code as 
Code, or The End of Intellectual Property as We Know It” (1999) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 6(3), 
308-318; Lee Bygrave, Contract vs. Statute in Internet Governance, in Research Handbook on Governance of the Internet, Ian 
Brown, ed., Edgar Elgar, Cheltenham (2013) at 172 
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clauses.51 Consequently, the decisions analyzing the effectiveness of various contract 
formation interfaces or the enforceability of standardized terms have a procedural tint. 
US cases and literature rarely distinguish between incorporation and formation. The 
focus is usually on the incorporation of individual terms, which are analyzed in terms 
of enforceability.52 As only terms that have been incorporated are enforceable, the 
difference in terminology can be disregarded. Incorporation procedures are generally 
discussed in relation to the “manifestation of assent,”  “reason to know” and 
“opportunity to review.” The terms easily translate into the English law concepts. In 
certain circumstances users are deemed to know that terms are present – be it due to 
adequate notice or a clearly transactional context. Unfortunately, many US decisions 
are best described as “of limited utility” due to their distortion of contractual 
principles. This distortion is popularly justified by the need to promote e-commerce or 
transactions in technology. In one of the most prominent cases, ProCD v Zeidenberg, 
Judge Easterbrook emphasized that the master of the offer can prescribe acceptance in 
any manner and that intention can be expressed in any manner.53 ProCD concerned 
the enforceability of terms disclosed after an event that would commonly be regarded 
as the moment of formation: the exchange of money and goods. 54 The case separated 
notice of terms from their availability and went against the basic idea that parties must 
agree on all the terms of the contract. Unfortunately, ProCD was followed in 
numerous cases.55 What subsequent courts seem to remember about ProCD is the 
economic necessity of enforcing online contracts to protect a technology market even 
if traditional contract doctrine is sacrificed in the process. According to Winn, 
electronic contracting cases exemplify “legal realism”: “judges will manipulate the 
doctrine to achieve the outcomes they consider fair or practical.”56 Such practices, 
however, have been heavily criticized in US scholarship, 57 especially in terms of their 
compliance with the UCC. 58  The approach to US case law must therefore be cautious 
and selective as not correctly implementing the contractual principles in the online 
environment. The general rule remains that the offeree can only accept what was 
offered and that terms must be available before acceptance. Alternatively, if we want 
to depart from the artificial offer and acceptance model, we can simply state that no 
terms can be introduced after the act concluding the contract formation process. 
Introducing terms after such act constitutes an attempt to modify an existing contract.  
 
In the EU, including England, judicial decisions have become a less significant source 
of legal developments in the area of e-commerce due to the increased role of 
regulatory agencies and the application of consumer protection laws to online 
transactions. European consumer protection legislation created a thicket of rules that 
must be complied with by an operator in order to engage in any commercial activity 
online. Accordingly, it became necessary to create a separate code to navigate the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Jane Winn, The impact of EU unfair contract terms law on U.S. business-to-consumer internet merchants (2006) 62 Bus. 
Law. 209  at 213 
52 see e.g. Moore v Microsoft Corp 293 AD 2d 587 (2nd Dep’t 2002) 
53 ProCD, Inc v Zeidenberg, 86 F 3d 1447 at 1452 
54 Earlier shrink-wrap cases precluded the enforcement of terms disclosed after the purchaser obtained the software, see: Step-
Saver Data Systems Inc v Wyse Technology  939 F 2d 91 (3d Cir 1991) 
55 Hill v Gateway 2000 Inc 105 F 3d 1147 (7th Cir 1997); Bower v Gateway 2000 Inc 676 NYS 2d 569 (NYAD 1998);  
56 Jane Winn, Brian Bix ‘Diverging Perspectives on Electronic Contracting in the U.S. and EU (2006) 54 Cleve. St. L.Rev. 175 
at 179 
57 W H Lawrence, Rolling Contracts Rolling Over Contract Law (2004) 41 San Diego L Rev 1099; R A Hillman, Rolling 
Contracts (2002) 71 Fordham L Rev 743 
58 for a detailed critique see: R C Bern, “Terms Later” Contracting: Bad Economics, Bad Morals, and a Bad Idea for a 
Uniform Law, Judge Easterbrook Notwithstanding (2004) 12 J L & Pol’y 641;  J Braucher, Delayed Disclosure in Consumer 
E-Commerce as an Unfair and Deceptive Practice (2002) 46 Wayne L Rev 1805; 
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regulatory instruments purportedly serving to promote e-commerce.59  The most 
significant differences between EU and U.S. consumer contract law applicable to 
ToUs are attributable to the Electronic Commerce Directive (“ECD”) 60 and the 
Distance Selling Directive (“DSD”).61  The ECD regulates so-called “information 
society service providers,” a term including Internet service providers as well as 
online merchants and advertisers. Seemingly, the term encompasses anyone who 
makes commercial communications over the Internet or provides Internet 
connectivity. Although the ECD purports to govern “information society services,” it 
seems inherently unsuitable to regulate transactions in information and to TOUs 
governing its use. According to the ECD, operators must provide minimum 
information (e.g., name, place of establishment, e-mail address) to users. Prior to the 
formation of a contract, operators must explain the steps required to enter into a 
contract, as well as inform users whether the contract is accessible after formation. In 
addition, operators must provide effective means of identifying and correcting errors 
in the formation process. While the ECD can be praised for requiring an explanation 
of the contracting sequence, it must be noted that such explanation may be contained 
within the very terms governing the transaction in which case it will only be as 
effective as the communication of the terms itself.  More importantly, as new 
commercial models have already “overtaken” those that dominated at the time the 
directive was drafted, its provisions may have a wider reach than originally intended. 
The aforementioned broad definition of “information society services” and the liberal 
interpretation of “remuneration” imply that the mere use of a website may be 
governed by the ECD. 62 Technically, any request for information or the use of a 
service provided on a website constitutes an order and triggers the application of Art 
10, which prescribes the provision of certain information.63 Similarly, the DSD 
requires complete disclosure of the terms of the contract prior to its formation. The 
information must be provided in writing or another durable medium accessible to the 
consumer. If the disclosures were made in the correct form and at the correct time, the 
consumer's right to cancel an order must be exercised within seven days of receipt of 
the goods purchased. If the disclosures were not made, the right to cancel may be 
exercised until seven days after receipt of the written disclosures. Both the ECD and 
the DSD focus on the provision of information. More information is equated with 
more protection to the user. In practice, this translates into a more content-heavy 
transacting interface and possibly – longer ToUs. While this in itself appears 
questionable, the more surprising requirements pertain to the provision of such 
information - including the ToUs - in a manner allowing subsequent storage and 
reproduction.64 The latter concepts are extremely difficult to replicate online. To 
aggravate matters, the European Court of Justice recently held that certain 
information was not disclosed because it was provided via a hyperlink.65 As the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Code of EU Online Rights, 2012 
60 Directive 2000/31/EC on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Services, in particular Electronic Commerce in the Internal 
Market 
61 Directive 97/7/EC on the Protection of Consumers in Respect of Distance Contracts; transposed into national alaw as 
Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations, 2000, S.I. 2000/2334; updated by Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) 
(Amendment) Regulations, 2005, S.I. 2005/689, (U.K.); see generally: Jane Winn, The impact of EU unfair contract terms law 
on U.S. business-to-consumer internet merchants (2006) 62 Bus. Law. 209   
62 See: ECD Recital 18, which extends “information society services” to “services which are not remunerated by those who 
receive them, such as those offering on-line information or commercial communications, or those providing tools allowing for 
search, access and retrieval of data.” 
63 Notably, Art 10 requires a description of the different technical steps required to conclude the contract as well as the 
availability of contractual terms in a manner permitting storage and reproduction. 
64 ECD Art 10(3) 
65 Content Services Ltd v. Bundesarbeitskammer Case C-49/11, July 2012; see also: C Goanta, Information Duties in the Internet 
Era: Case Note on Content Services v. Bundesarbeitskammer (2013) 2 European Review of Private Law, 643-660 
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website could be modified it was not “available on a lasting basis.”66 Moreover, the 
website to which the link connected did not permit storage and reproduction in an 
unchanged form.67 The mere possibility of printing or storing the page by the user was 
considered irrelevant as in such instance, the durable medium was “generated by the 
user and not the vendor.”68 Surprisingly then, in the EU, the legal effectiveness of 
ToUs may depend on the ability to provide them in a durable form. Their availability 
behind a hyperlink is considered insufficient. 
 
A technological approach… 
Above I have discussed the legal principles pertaining to the recognition of ToUs as 
valid contracts. All problems seem to derive from the novelty of the context in which 
online transactions take place as well as from the changed subject matter of these 
transactions. We can look at ToUs from yet another, much broader perspective and 
we can debate the legal principles involved not in terms of their applicability (as this 
cannot be questioned) but in terms of how they should be applied in online 
transactions. We must take a step back first. It cannot be questioned that the Internet 
economy empowers consumers and opens new markets to smaller businesses. Both 
enjoy more choice with regards to potential contracting partners. Both can freely and 
inexpensively communicate their terms and preferences. Neither phenomenon, 
however, leads to equality between the transacting parties or the ability to negotiate 
terms.69 ToUs are standardized and unilaterally imposed. Users and operators do not 
‘meet in cyberspace’ to arrive at mutually beneficial arrangements. Operators provide 
terms on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The resulting problems are not new. Mass-market 
agreements have always raised questions in relation to what terms are unfair (content 
control) and what requirements must be meet for terms to become incorporated 
(inclusion control). Standardized agreements have always created controversies as to 
whether we can still analyze them in terms of “promises” and “agreements.” We 
must, however, remember that despite such academic doubts standard contracts are 
binding although they have not been read, understood or even known of.70 Issues 
pertaining to substantive fairness of standard terms are not Internet-specific.71 What is 
specific to the online environment concerns procedural aspects. Problems of standard 
form contracting become enriched by additional elements: one party not only imposes 
terms but also designs the contracting interface or the entire transacting environment. 
While operators have little control over how users view or navigate their websites,72 
they also have novel ways of manipulating user behavior.73 The “technological 
management” 74 of the user easily translates into technological manipulation. In 
addition, we must acknowledge the cognitive distortions of transacting interfaces and 
the potential for disorientation. Unlike the traditional “transacting interfaces” of 
counters and shop displays, users are dealing in a two-dimensional and non-linear 
environment that may lack familiar clues. We must mention the sheer information 
overload. It is frequently forgotten that providing more information need not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 id at 24 
67 Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi, delivered 6 March 2012, referring to case C-49/11, at 42 
68 id at 43 
69 Bert-Jaap Koops, Law, Technology and Shifting Power Relations (2010) 25 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 973 at 1006 
70 Andrew Robertson, ‘The Limits of Voluntariness in Contract’ (2005) 29 Melb U L Rev 186, 197. 
71 Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-Standard Terms Backfire? (2006) 104 
Mich. L. Rev. 837 (2006) 
72 Specht v Netscape Communications 306 F 3d 17 at 24 
73 R A Hillman, J J Rachlinski, Standard Form Contracting in the Electronic Age (2002) 77 NYULR 429 at 479 
74 Roger Brownsword, The Shaping of our on-line worlds: getting the regulatory environment right (2012) 20 IJLIT vol 4, 249 
at 253  
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necessarily create informed customers.75 Although users can read the terms at their 
leisure, 76  they often display a sense of urgency and impatiently click through 
numerous screens. Immediate gratification overrides informational needs. The 
information density of the online environment must therefore be evaluated against the 
limited information processing ability of an average user. 77  More information 
provided online may further reduce the likelihood of reviewing the terms. Hillman 
argues that users are accustomed to the speed of the Internet and are thus even less 
likely to evaluate the fine print. 78  Preston & McCann emphasize the general 
acceleration of the online transacting process that derives from the lack of formalities 
and physical clues.79 This further reduces the awareness that a user may have had in 
traditional contracting settings. The problem is not information deficit but attention 
deficit. 
 
It is against this background that we must ask: shouldn’t contract law be applied more 
stringently to online interactions to compensate for the aforementioned factors? More 
importantly, should we demand the exact implementation of legal principles now that 
technology gives us the ability to do so? For example, the mechanism of 
incorporating terms by reference is characterized by real-life impracticalities. Most 
doctrinal compromises and legal fictions are based on the factual inability to 
implement contractual principles. What if the inability disappears? Technology can 
create underinformed and overwhelmed users, but it can also facilitate on-line 
contracting.80 Given the technological capabilities available to operators, there are no 
practical justifications for tolerating the delayed provision of terms or “creative 
compliance” with notice or disclosure requirements or for any other manipulation of 
contractual theory to circumvent the communication of terms before formation. There 
is little room for legal fictions given the importance of terms and the fact that they 
contain: (a) usage or access restrictions, which may otherwise remain imperceptible 
and unknown,81 and (b) communication rules prescribing how to express assent. 
There is also an increased interdependence between law and technology. Technology 
can improve the achievement of regulatory purposes and the application of legal 
principles.82 Technology can be used to protect rights and to facilitate the enforcement 
of certain prohibitions, based on statute or on private agreement. The design of the 
interface can encourage or discourage communication.83 Technology can also be used 
to better apply the law. In the second instance, we are not talking about protection or 
enhancement of the law or legal principles, as is the case with digital rights 
management technologies and copyright, but of taking avail of the capabilities of 
technology to better apply the principles of contract law. Consequently, the online 
environment enables operators to follow the law verbatim, to ensure actual 
communication of terms and to provide reasonable notice. These possibilities are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 M Budnitz, Consumers Surfing for Sales in Cyberspace: What Constitutes Acceptance and What Legal Terms and 
Conditions Bind the Consumer? (2000) 16 Ga St U L Rev 741 at 775, 780 
76 Novak v Overture Services Inc 309 F Supp 2d 446 (EDNY 2004 ), where the court stressed that the plaintiff had an 
opportunity to read the terms and conditions with no time limitation, at 452;  
77 See generally: Eliza Mik, ‘Some technological Implications of Ascertaining the Contents of Contracts in Web-based 
Transactions’ (2011) 27 CLSR 368 
78 Robert A. Hillman, ‘Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-Standard Terms Backfire?’ 104 Mich. L. 
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often not present in the real world. If judges were to require an actual presentation 
(not even communication) of terms as a pre-condition of incorporation, commerce 
would come to a halt. In the world of brick-and-mortar shops, the contracting process 
encounters many factual constraints. These constraints are, however, absent online. 
While it is difficult to prescribe specific technological requirements as to how 
transacting interfaces should be designed to alert the user that (a) a transaction is 
taking place and/or (b) that such transaction is governed by terms, it can be required 
as a matter of principle that operators use whatever technology they have available to 
improve communication with users. At the same time, it must not be forgotten that 
even if users are alerted to the transaction and even if an opportunity to read the terms 
is provided, most users will ignore it. Similarly, if websites are coded to self-display 
ToUs in pop-up windows, users will complain about their intrusiveness and revert to 
pop-up blockers. Judges, regulators and operators may have to resign themselves to 
the fact that irrespective of the technology used and irrespective of the amount of 
information provided users will not read it. Operators should not, however, be 
allowed to “hide behind” the objective theory of contract and use it to their advantage. 
When evaluating the online interface provided by the operator courts must make 
allowance for the cognitive challenges faced by users. At the same time, courts must 
not allow users to plead ignorance of the facts that terms exist and that not everything 
on the Internet is “for free.” Subjective feelings of entitlement should be as irrelevant 
in contract law as they are in intellectual property law.  
 
Final Reflections 
The horse has left the barn: we cannot deny or downplay the fact that a link to ToUs 
is present at the bottom of most websites. Leaving aside questions of substantive 
fairness, ToUs are available and, depending on the size of the screen, visible. It is 
difficult to plead ignorance of their existence. While the omnipresence of ToUs need 
not translate into their binding legal character, it prevents users from arguing 
ignorance. Such arguments are inevitably circular: “we had not idea that a transaction 
is taking place because we assumed the content is available without restrictions and 
without charge and therefore we did not expect terms.” We could also endlessly 
debate whether the mere presence of ToUs can be regarded as an alert that a 
transaction is taking place. We could also argue that the mere fact that a contract has 
been formed does not necessarily imply that the ToUs have become incorporated. At 
the same time, however, if we acknowledge the existence of a contract, we must also 
acknowledge the presence of contractual intention and with it – an expectation of 
terms. These debates will, inevitably, lead us into a blind alley. The problem is not 
one of formation or incorporation. The problem is the changing nature of the web and 
the business models that have evolved online. Although amazon’s business model 
differs from that of google, both form part of a complex ecosystem where personal 
information is becoming the currency of exchange and where increasing value is 
placed on “pure information” that is otherwise not protected by intellectual property 
rights. We must therefore ask: did the user have a choice not to visit the website or 
use the information? Was there any reason the user could objectively expect the 
information to be provided without any restrictions? More importantly, did the 
operator deploy any technologies to increase or decrease the likelihood of 
communicating the terms or deflect the users attention from the fact that his continued 
browsing is subject to contract? It is too late to declare ToUs ineffective or to 
introduce additional regulatory requirements for their validity. The only method of 
addressing the legal challenges created thereby is through a conservative 
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interpretation and application of contract law principles. In parallel, operators and 
users alike must use the available technologies of presenting and communicating 
content to their advantage. It must not be forgotten that commercial certainty requires 
objectivity, a detachment from the state of mind of individual participants and from 
their individual beliefs. 
 
It seems unnecessary to propose a distinct “Asian approach” to ToUs. The approach 
to US cases must be extremely cautious, as US courts often seem overly concerned 
with the promotion of online transactions at the expense of the user and the basic 
principles of contract law. The EU approach, however, seems equally inadequate as 
contract law is becoming distorted by excessive consumer protections. More 
information is not necessarily better.84 It can be doubted that more information has a 
protective effect, creates transparency or informed users. Singapore has the luxury of 
being able to follow the English law of contract in its original form, without any 
regulatory “adornments.” The aim is not to protect doctrinal purity or preserve 
contract law in its classic state. There must be cogent reasons to depart from its 
principles. Such reasons do not seem to exist in online transactions in relation to 
ToUs. The classic principles of contract law, if applied verbatim, can not only 
accommodate new technology and the challenges of the online environment but also 
provide protections for its users. At the same time, operators can enjoy the certainty 
that derives from a consistent application of traditional principles. There is also no 
need for doctrinal compromises based on real-life constraints. Online technologies 
enable operators to create better informed users and improve the communication of 
terms and quality of contractual intention.  
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